Louisiana Law Review
Volume 74 | Number 2
Eastern District of Louisiana: The Nation's MDL
Laboratory - A Symposium
Winter 2014

The Land of Oz: Spoliation of Evidence in
Louisiana
Danielle Borel

Repository Citation
Danielle Borel, The Land of Oz: Spoliation of Evidence in Louisiana, 74 La. L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol74/iss2/10

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

The Land of Oz: Spoliation of Evidence in Louisiana
INTRODUCTION
Take a trip down the yellow brick road. The Wizard decided to
sell a new energy drink, Courage. The Cowardly Lion, in need of
courage, bought and consumed the beverage. Shortly thereafter he
became ill and incurred medical expenses from a week’s stay in the
hospital. The Lion’s attorney quickly notified the Wizard of the
Lion’s intention to file suit against the Wizard, alleging that the Lion
consumed Courage from a bad batch. Upon hearing of the potential
litigation, the Wizard destroyed all of the samples from that
particular batch. Without any “bad” Courage to test, the Lion was
unable to prove the drink made him sick and could not recover
damages.
The Wizard’s actions are commonly known as “spoliation of
evidence.” Spoliation of evidence occurs when a party destroys,
conceals, or alters evidence in order to disadvantage another party.1
The Wizard’s malicious intent qualifies his actions as intentional
spoliation of evidence. In this situation, the Lion has a claim for
intentional spoliation of evidence, which is most likely recognized
by the courts of Oz.2
If the above scenario is altered slightly, the result varies greatly.
Now, imagine that the Lion could not recover the allegedly “bad”
batch of Courage, yet he could not prove that the Wizard
intentionally destroyed it. Further, Oz Code article 1939 demands
that manufacturers of beverages retain one finished product from
each batch for at least four years after its creation. This situation
should be actionable under a version of negligent spoliation that
roots the duty to preserve the evidence in the statute. In many
jurisdictions, however, despite the law creating a duty mandating
that the Wizard keep such evidence, the Lion would be without a
remedy.3
Finally, consider a slightly different scenario: On hearing of the
Lion’s sickness, the Wizard separated the bad batch from the rest
and stored it in a closet. Then, at the time of trial, the Wizard learned
that one of his employees mistakenly threw away the bad batch. In
this situation, though it seems that the Lion should be entitled to
Copyright 2014, by DANIELLE “DANI” BOREL.
1. Rachel A. Campbell, Effect of Spoliation of Evidence in Tort Actions
Other than Product Liability Actions, 121 A.L.R. 5th 157, 157 (2004); Randolph
v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1994).
2. See infra Part I.B.
3. See infra Part I.B.
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some recovery, this form of negligent spoliation of evidence is also
not recognized by many jurisdictions.4
The Lion’s predicament is the same as the dilemma facing
Louisiana’s doctrine of spoliation. As noted in Lewis v. Albertson’s
Inc., “[t]he Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to address the potential
tort right of spoliation stemming from negligence principles,
including its requirements and the remedy for this cause of action;
the issue is certainly ripe for consideration.”5 In Louisiana, negligent
spoliation is controversial and disputed.6 For instance, in Arnold v.
Brookshire Grocery Co., the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeals enumerated the elements of spoliation as follows: “(1) the
intentional or negligent destruction of evidence and (2) that the first
element was for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of its use.”7 In
theory, the Arnold court found that a party may negligently deprive
a party of evidence for a purpose. In reality, however, to do
something negligently with a purpose is impossible.8 This logical
fallacy illustrates the lack of clarity in Louisiana law and, in
particular, the difficulties of determining the elements of negligent
or intentional spoliation of evidence. As neither the Louisiana
Supreme Court nor the Louisiana Legislature has addressed this
issue, the Louisiana courts, lawyers, and potential litigants direly
need a coherent doctrine for consistent guidance, adequate
preparation, and protection against injury, respectively.
This Comment proposes a treatment of spoliation that would
offer clarity to courts on the issue. Specifically, this Comment
contains two arguments. First, the Louisiana Supreme Court ought
to accept the current theory of intentional spoliation found in the
Louisiana appellate courts.9 Second, this Comment argues for the
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 774–75 (La. Ct. App. 2d
2006).
6. See infra Part II.C.
7. Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 1279, 1280 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2009).
8. State v. Vinzant, 7 So. 2d 917, 922 (La. 1942).
9. Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 05-0287,
2009 WL 3015076, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2009) (“All five Louisiana Circuit
Courts of Appeal have recognized [intentional] spoliation as a valid tort claim.
Accordingly, it is this Court’s Erie guess that the Louisiana Supreme Court would
find spoliation of the evidence to be a valid tort claim.” (citations omitted));
Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09-0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2–3 (W.D. La. Dec. 14,
2011) (“The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, therefore federal
courts must make an Erie guess to determine as best as it can what that court
would decide. . . . [T]he Louisiana Supreme Court would only recognize
spoliation based on intentional conduct.” (quoting Union Pump, 2009 WL
3015076, at *5)).
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Louisiana Supreme Court and Louisiana Legislature to recognize
negligent spoliation. Negligent spoliation is the more controversial
form of spoliation and the focus of this Comment. The Comment
begins by looking at the origin of the tort of spoliation before
analyzing the tort under Louisiana’s legal precepts. Part I examines
the doctrines of other states, starting with the origin of spoliation
generally in California and then discussing some states that have
recognized negligent spoliation. Part II discusses Louisiana’s
various approaches to spoliation. The Louisiana circuit courts vary
on the elements of: (1) the knowledge of a potential suit, (2) the
failure to produce needed evidence without explanation, and (3) the
level of culpability required.10 Because the most controversial issue
is whether negligent spoliation is actionable, this Comment also
examines in depth the evolution of three lines of reasoning regarding
spoliation. Part III argues that Louisiana should recognize a cause of
action for negligent spoliation. Such recognition would conform to
existing Louisiana law and jurisprudence and is necessary to uphold
the principles of judicial integrity, fairness, and truth.11
I. THE APPEARANCE OF THE RUBY SLIPPERS: BACKGROUND
A. Munchkinland: Spoliation’s Infancy
Analyzing the inception of spoliation and the reasons for its
creation validates the need to recognize negligent spoliation in
Louisiana. The first court to recognize the tort of spoliation,
specifically intentional spoliation, was a California appellate court in
Smith v. Superior Court.12 In Smith, the defendant’s wheel flew off
of his van and into the windshield of the plaintiff’s vehicle, causing
injury to the plaintiff.13 Abbot Ford, the automobile dealer that
customized the van before the defendant bought it, promised the
plaintiff’s counsel that he would keep the relevant van parts that
would be needed as physical evidence.14 Subsequently, the
dealership “destroyed, lost or transferred” the requested parts,
effectively eliminating the chance of success for any possible defect
claim.15 The plaintiffs then amended their petition to include a claim
for “Tortious Interference with Prospective Civil Actions By
10. See infra Part II.A–C.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); 18 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts
515 (2013).
13. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Spoliation of Evidence.”16 The court held that it was appropriate to
recognize a new tort to deal with intentional spoliation of
evidence.17 The court supported its decision with Dean Prosser’s
concept of protection against “interference with the interest of
others.”18 The court expressed some reservation in recognizing the
new tort action due to the difficulty of determining damages.19 In
dispelling this concern, the court discussed other actions that are
recognized despite uncertain damages, such as libel, slander,
wrongful death, and personal injury cases.20 Smith opened the door
for other courts to recognize intentional spoliation of evidence.
Soon after Smith, California also recognized negligent
spoliation.21 In Velasco v. Commercial Building, a cleaning staff
member threw away critical evidence that was sitting on an
attorney’s desk.22 The attorney then brought suit against the cleaning
staff company for the destruction of the evidence. The attorney’s
claim was essentially a negligent spoliation claim, which had not yet
been recognized by California courts.23 In recognizing that a claim
for negligent spoliation should exist, the Velasco court focused its
analysis on the foreseeability of the harm that the destruction of
evidence would cause the plaintiff.24 The court noted that
foreseeability of the harm is gauged by more than just the
probability of a behavior resulting in the harm.25 Rather,
foreseeability that a person’s actions could cause harm includes
actions that a reasonable, thoughtful person would consider as

16. Id.
17. Id. at 832.
18. William Prosser served as the dean of UC Berkeley School of Law. He is
best known for his work entitled Privacy, which described an individual’s right to
privacy. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Firsts at Berkeley Law, SFGATE, Feb. 26,
2012, http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Privacy-firsts-at-Berkeley-Law-336
1110.php; Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (“The law of torts is anything but static,
and the limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the
plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the
defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to
a remedy. . . . The common threat woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable
interference with the interests of others.” (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 1, at 3–4, 6 (4th ed. 1971))).
19. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
20. Id. at 836.
21. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985) (“[W]e hold that a cause of action may be stated for negligent
destruction of evidence needed for prospective civil litigation.”).
22. Id. at 505.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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guidance for practical behavior.26 If a person creates a slight risk of
injury to another, he may be held liable if a reasonably prudent
person would not have done so.27 Applying this reasoning to the
facts, the Velasco court considered whether the person who
destroyed the evidence would “be expected to believe that he or she
would destroy valuable evidence which might decrease a client’s
chance of recovery in a product liability action” under the
circumstances.28
Further, the Velasco court supported its recognition of negligent
spoliation claims by looking to two previously recognized torts:
“negligent interference with prospective economic advantage” and
“intentional interference with prospective business advantage.”29 In
both tort actions, the absence of the necessary component resulted in
the loss of a future economic benefit to the plaintiff. Implicitly, the
court was analogizing the harms created by negligent spoliation with
an economic loss and stated “that both causes of action would
reimburse victims for probable expectancies, which make up ‘a
large part of what is most valuable in modern life.’”30 When
negligent spoliation occurs, the wrongful destruction of evidence
can result in the harmed party either losing a judgment that it would
have been entitled to recover or paying a judgment for which it was
not liable. In Velasco, the economic harm was the judgment amount
that the plaintiff would have received in his products liability claim
had the evidence not been destroyed. Nevertheless, despite the
Velasco court’s recognition of negligent spoliation as a valid tort
claim, it found that the plaintiff in that case was unable to recover
under that theory.31
Smith and Velasco paved the way for more widespread
development of the tort of spoliation. Beginning in products liability
cases, the doctrine then infiltrated other areas of the law and other
states.32 As with any new tort, some states were quick to follow suit,
while others rejected the foreign concept.33 In particular, only a few
states subsequently recognized negligent spoliation.

26. Id. at 506.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 505–06.
30. Sean R. Levine, Spoliation of Evidence in West Virginia: Do Too Many
Torts Spoliate the Broth?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 419, 425 (2002).
31. Velasco, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 506–07.
32. See Levine, supra note 30, at 425–26.
33. Id. at 426.
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B. Follow the Yellow Brick Road: Later States to Recognize
Negligent Spoliation
After the decisions in California, other states began to evaluate
their own positions on intentional and negligent spoliation.34 Some
states settled the doctrine judicially,35 while others passed statutes.36
Nonetheless, most states have not formally recognized either form
of spoliation as a tort action.37 Specifically, the only jurisdictions to
recognize negligent spoliation as of 2006 were Alabama, California,
Indiana, Montana, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.38
Illinois and Pennsylvania found recognition of a separate tort
unnecessary because the effects of negligent spoliation could be
remedied under existing “general negligence principles.”39 Before
advocating for the recognition of negligent spoliation, it is important
to review the laws of other states that find negligent spoliation
actionable in order to determine if their reasons are applicable in
Louisiana.
Some states found it necessary to recognize negligent spoliation
in order to allow an action to be brought against a third party who is
not involved in the original litigation.40 West Virginia is one of these
states. It recognizes negligent spoliation against third parties but not
against parties to original civil action.41 The West Virginia Supreme
Court found that sufficient remedies already existed for a party to a
civil action to compensate the opposing party for evidence that was
lost or destroyed.42 These available solutions did not, however,
address spoliation by a third party.43 In recognizing a theory of
negligent spoliation by a third party, the court discussed some
concerns: namely, that a duty did not exist to preserve evidence and
that, if the third parties were the owners of such evidence, the
owners would normally have the right to handle their property as
34. MARGARET M. KOESEL ET AL., SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS
REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 53, 56
(Daniel F. Gourash ed., 2000).
35. MASS. GUIDE TO EVID. § 1102, at 284 (2013), available at http://www
.mass.gov/courts/sjc/guide-to-evidence/massguidetoevidence.pdf.
36. Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000).
37. KOESEL, supra note 34, at 55.
38. Id. at 50; Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 2003).
39. KOESEL, supra note 34, at 51.
40. See Smith, 771 So. 2d at 432–33; Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d
11, 18 (Mont. 1999); Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 566.
41. Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 566 (establishing that the state courts do “not
recognize spoliation of evidence as a stand-alone tort when the spoliation is the
result of the negligence of a party to a civil action”).
42. Id. at 567.
43. Id. at 568.
AND
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they see fit.44 Nevertheless, the equity behind the tort of spoliation
outweighed these concerns.45 In recognizing spoliation, the court
cited the state constitution, which guarantees the right to use the
court system to seek justice and the general principle of searching
for the truth that underlies the judicial system.46 “Simply put, such
highly improper and unjustifiable conduct ought to be actionable.”47
Thus, for the reasons of equity and justice, West Virginia recognized
a form of negligent spoliation.
Similar to the West Virginia Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
of Montana based its recognition of negligent spoliation against a
third party on notions of truth and fairness.48 Building on the idea
that damages could be awarded against a party who destroyed
evidence and impaired the investigation of an officer, the court
found that “[r]elevant evidence is critical to the search for truth.”49
The Supreme Court of Montana specified that it was essential for
the lower courts to take measures that would ensure “that the parties
to the litigation have a fair opportunity to present their claims or
defenses.”50 In order to protect the opportunities each party should
be afforded, the court recognized negligent spoliation claims against
third parties.51
Finally, select states have imposed the necessity of a narrow
duty in order to limit the application of negligent spoliation.52 This
reasoning was present in Alabama’s recognition of negligent
spoliation.53 Finding that the concept of negligent spoliation was
consistent with Alabama’s general negligence principles, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that a plaintiff would similarly have to
show a breached duty, proximate cause, and damages.54 Alabama
courts require a plaintiff to show “(1) that the defendant spoliator
had actual knowledge of pending or potential litigation; (2) that a
duty was imposed upon the defendant through a voluntary
undertaking, an agreement, or a specific request; and (3) that the
missing evidence was vital to the plaintiff's pending or potential
action.”55 Thus, the court reasoned that the third party could decline
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 572.
47. Id.
48. Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont. 1999).
49. Id. at 17.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 17–18.
52. Id. at 20; Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569 (W. Va. 2003); Smith v.
Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000).
53. Smith, 771 So. 2d at 432.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 432.
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to take responsibility for the evidence, which would keep the burden
of risk with the plaintiff, but if the third party agreed to take
responsibility for the evidence, it formed a duty.56 This type of
negligent spoliation that requires such a specific duty curtails
negligent spoliation to only claims where the “spoliator has acted
wrongfully in a specifically identified way.”57 Establishment of
these elements creates a rebuttable presumption that “but for the fact
of the spoliation of evidence the plaintiff would have recovered in
the pending or potential litigation.”58 Alabama’s model is a limited
form of negligent spoliation that hinges on an agreement between
the parties.59
These states’ approaches to negligent spoliation demonstrate
that, unfortunately, there is no consensus on how to handle negligent
spoliation claims.60 The confusion created by the lack of guidance is
exemplified in Louisiana, which has specifically grappled with
defining and accepting the concept of negligent spoliation.
II. THE SEARCH FOR THE EMERALD CITY: LOUISIANA’S ADVENTURES
Spoliation of evidence is a relatively new tort concept to
Louisiana, which grew out of the State’s use of adverse
presumptions.61 Adverse presumptions or discovery sanctions are
used to counter the negative effects of ruined evidence “by
56. Id. at 433.
57. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234,
241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)).
58. Id. at 432–33.
59. Id. at 433.
60. Arkansas implements an adverse presumption when the defending party
has destroyed evidence but refuses to recognize spoliation as a separate tort. See
Goff v. Harold Ives Trucking Co., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Ark. 2000). Texas
has not recognized spoliation as a separate tort, finding that spoliation does not
harm a party outside of the cause of action from which it arose. See Brookshire
Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL 2982902, at *5 (Tex.
App. July 30, 2010). Connecticut recognizes intentional spoliation and awards
“the full amount of compensatory damages that he or she would have received if
the underlying action had been pursued successfully.” Rizzuto v. Davidson
Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1181 (Conn. 2006).
61. Karen Wells Roby & Pamela W. Carter, Spoliation: The Case of the
Missing Evidence, 47 LA. B.J. 222, 224 (1999) (“The impact of the presumption
on the quality of evidence significantly diminished with the reasonable
explanation rule and the occasional notice and showing of intent requirements.
Litigants in Louisiana who needed to advance or defend a case began seeking a
remedy against a party who spoliated evidence. In Williams v. General Motors . . .
third party plaintiff, General Motors, sought the recognition of a tort against an
attorney and insurer for destroying evidence it needed to defend against the
plaintiff’s product liability claim.”).
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instructing the jury . . . that had the evidence in question been
presented, it would be unfavorable to the party spoliator.”62 In other
words, when a plaintiff’s case is injured because the plaintiff is
unable to prove a part of the case due to the defendant’s failure to
turn over evidence, the jury is instructed to assume that the evidence
would have benefitted the plaintiff.63 This mechanism attempts to
level the playing field. Adverse presumptions are both
compensatory and punitive in nature.64
Traditionally, only intentional acts of spoliation were actionable
and thus eligible for an adverse presumption.65 At common law,
spoliation was based on the idea that a party is more likely to
destroy evidence that is adverse or harmful to his or her case than to
refuse to turn over evidence that would bolster the case.66 The
adverse presumption has been characterized in other jurisdictions as
“omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem: all things are presumed
against a wrongdoer.”67 Mere negligence was insufficient to support
“the inference of consciousness of a weak case.”68
Adverse presumptions, however, were applied inconsistently,
which, as the Louisiana Bar Journal noted in 1999, resulted “in
62. Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 3 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2000); Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La. 1992);
Pham v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 882 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000); Roby &
Carter, supra note 61, at 223 (“The adverse presumption was first applied in
Louisiana in the 1910 case of Varnado v. Banner Cotton. In Varnado, the
Louisiana Supreme Court applied the adverse presumption against corporate
managers who refused to produce records of the corporation during a proceeding
seeking the appointment of a receiver. The court held that the managers’ refusal to
produce the records suggested that the records would show that the corporation
was being mismanaged thereby warranting the appointment of a receiver. During
the Varnado era, the presumption had a strong impact on the quality of evidence
presented. If a person had evidence and refused to produce it, the presumption
would apply against him. The integrity of the judicial system was protected. More
than 60 years after Varnado, parties began seeking the application of the
presumption to matters where the evidence was lost, discarded or destroyed. Once
the courts extended the adverse presumption to cases involving spoliated evidence,
a conflict developed in the circuits regarding when it would apply.”).
63. Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669, 673 (La. Ct.
App. 5th 2009); FRANK L. MARAIST, EVIDENCE AND PROOF § 4.3, in 19
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 72 (2007) (“If a party knowingly destroys
evidence (spoliates), there is a logical inference that he or she did so because the
evidence would have been unfavorable to him or her.”).
64. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357,
1365 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 1361.
66. Id.
67. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL
2982902, at *4 (Tex. App. July 30, 2010).
68. Kammerer, 633 So. 2d at 1361 (Waltzer, J., concurring).
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additional requests for the recognition of the tort of spoliation.”69
Further, adverse presumptions were ineffective against persons who
were not parties to the litigation.70 Such was the case in Desselle v.
Jefferson Hospital District No. 2, when a plaintiff desired to bring
suit against the manufacturer of a hospital gurney.71 The plaintiff fell
off of the gurney and was injured, either because the hospital
employee “failed to set the brake or the brake failed.”72 The plaintiff
claimed his case against the manufacturer was hindered by the
hospital’s disposal of the gurney.73 The Desselle court allowed the
plaintiff to bring a claim of spoliation against the hospital, though
ultimately the plaintiff was unsuccessful.74 To remedy similar
situations, courts have allowed a claim of spoliation to be brought
against third parties.75 However, this tort is no longer exclusive to
non-litigant parties.76 Claims in Louisiana have been allowed
against both the tortfeasor–defendant and third parties.77
The scope of the cause of action for spoliation is unsettled in
Louisiana.78 Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to
discuss either form of spoliation, all five state appellate circuit
courts have recognized intentional spoliation as a valid tort claim
and continue to battle over negligent spoliation.79 Because the State
as a whole lacks guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court and
the Louisiana Legislature, the circuits have attempted to sort out the
doctrine by themselves. In doing so, they have established varying
holdings within their circuits, overruled and reinstated cases at a
rapid pace, and clearly ignored previous holdings. In particular,
69. Roby & Carter, supra note 61, at 226 (“Consequently, with the continuing
push by parties for an adequate remedy for the spoliation problem, the form and
shape of the spoliation tort will inevitably occur. The recognition of this tort is
necessary to preserve the integrity of the system.”).
70. Desselle v. Jefferson Hosp. District No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 527, 534–35
(La. Ct. App. 5th 2004).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 527.
73. Id. at 534.
74. Id. at 535.
75. See Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1st
1994); Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006).
76. See Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2005);
McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 WL
3822225 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010); Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc.,
777 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2000); McCool v. Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814
So. 2d 116 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002).
77. See supra notes 75–76.
78. See Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09-0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2 (W.D. La.
Dec. 14, 2011).
79. Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 05-0287,
2009 WL 3015076, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2009).
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Louisiana appellate courts have had disagreements regarding the
concept of an adequate explanation, the required level of culpability,
and the source of the duty.80 Therefore, when handling a spoliation
claim, the courts have little guidance. The results have left Louisiana
with an unclear and disjointed delict.81
Courts have never followed an established set of elements for
spoliation. Yet, the jurisprudence shows courts typically consider
three “elements.” These elements are not always clearly articulated
within the cases, and the courts often blur the lines between them.
This Part will outline Louisiana jurisprudence according to these
unstated elements of spoliation. These elements are: (1) the
knowledge of a lawsuit; (2) failure to produce needed evidence
without an explanation; and (3) the requisite level of intent.
A. Knowledge of a Lawsuit
The first requirement found in the jurisprudence to hold a
defendant liable for spoliation is that the defendant knew or should
have known of a future or likely lawsuit.82 This criterion narrows the
instances in which a party has the heightened duty to protect or
retain possible evidence to situations in which it is most likely that
the evidence will actually be used or requested. The courts have
implicitly accepted this element.83
The first element, the knowledge requirement, grew out of the
“adequate explanation” exception to an adverse presumption.84 In
Babineaux v. Black, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether the third-party defendant should be granted an
adverse presumption against the defendant.85 The third-party
defendant, the manufacturer of the allegedly faulty product in
question, claimed that the primary defendant, the seller of the
product, spoliated evidence by not producing the product in question
for “inspection prior to trial.”86 The court found that an adverse
presumption was not warranted because the testimony explained the
defendant’s actions.87 “When the [product] was discarded, this suit
had not been filed, and the defendants obviously thought that
installing the new [product] would solve the problem to the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See infra Part II.A–C.
See Bertrand, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2.
Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004).
Id.
See Babineaux v. Black, 396 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1981).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiff’s satisfaction.”88 The court intertwined the idea of
knowledge of a lawsuit into the reasonable explanation exception.89
Now, knowledge of the suit stands as a separate element for proving
spoliation.90 Thus, courts clearly stipulate that “[w]here suit has not
been filed and there is no evidence that a party knew suit would be
filed when the evidence was discarded, the theory of spoliation of
evidence does not apply.”91
B. Failure to Produce Needed Evidence
In order to have a claim for spoliation, there must be the loss or
destruction of evidence that impairs the case of the claimant, which
the other party cannot adequately explain.92 Despite being addressed
as a single concept, in actuality, these ideas are an element with two
subparts and an affirmative defense, respectively. Therefore, these
components should be evaluated independently.
1. Evidence Must Have Previously Existed
The courts have found that if the evidence never existed, then
that is sufficient to defeat a claim for spoliation.93 Although a
claimant can allege spoliation for the destruction or loss of evidence,
he or she cannot bring a spoliation claim for the failure to create
evidence that would have been helpful.94 Allowing spoliation in
those circumstances would impose a duty that is far broader than the
88. Id.
89. For discussion of the “reasonable explanation exception,” see infra Part
II.B.3.
90. Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004).
91. Id. See also Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d
524, 534 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004); McCleary v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t,
No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010 WL 3822225, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010).
92. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(“Here, the destruction of the Smiths’ physical evidence took place before the trial
ever began, and the Smiths seek compensation for the alleged intentional
destruction of important evidence to be used in the forthcoming litigation.”);
Guillory v. Dillard’s Dept. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2000)
(“[B]oth causes of action are premised on the right of a plaintiff to be free from
interference in pursuing and/or proving his or her lawsuit.”); Arnold v. Brookshire
Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009) (“Ms. Romero’s
[destruction of the evidence] did not impair the plaintiff’s cause of action.”);
Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2006); Hebert
v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892, 905 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011).
93. See Clavier v. Our Lady of Lake Hosp., Inc., 112 So. 3d 881, 886 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 2012); Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721, 728 (La. Ct. App.
1st 2005).
94. Jackson, 906 So. 2d at 728.

2014]

COMMENT

519

policy intended behind the delict. In short, a complaint alleging
spoliation of evidence that never existed is facially invalid.95
In Jackson v. Home Depot, Mr. Jackson’s spoliation claim was
based on the theory that Home Depot failed to preserve evidence
because it did not fill out an accident report following the tort
incident in question.96 The court found that this allegation failed to
meet the burden of a well-pleaded complaint.97 “Mr. Jackson does
not clearly refer to any particular piece of evidence that he alleges
actually existed and which Home Depot intentionally destroyed in
order to deprive him of its use.”98 Vague references, suppositions,
and legal conclusions cannot take the place of succinct and definite
facts upon which a cause of action must depend.99 This finding
rested on the fact that Home Depot could not destroy something that
never existed.100
One case asserts that even if impairment is present, the mere
lack of the evidence is not actionable if the evidence has not been
destroyed or concealed but merely cannot be identified.101 The court
in Pham v. Contico International, Inc. held that the accused party
must have destroyed or concealed the evidence for it to be
actionable as spoliation.102 In Pham, the claimant’s assertion that his
employer “failed to identify, set aside, or further preserve the
particular collapsible crate needed as evidence” was insufficient to
establish a cause of action.103 The crate in question was still in use at
the warehouse because it was a needed piece of operation
equipment.104 The plaintiffs were welcome to visit the warehouse
and inspect the crate, but at the time of litigation, no one knew
which crate was the one involved in the incident.105 Thus, Pham
formed the idea that unless the absence of the evidence is caused by
concealment or destruction, it is not spoliation. In this case, the
failure to identify the crate in question was not seen as being
equivalent to destroying the evidence. Because spoliation is based
on the destruction, alteration, or failure to produce evidence, it
95. Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Nunley, 77 So. 3d 457, 465 (La. Ct. App. 2d
2011) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Mr. May’s
explanation that the hard data sought by the Nunleys never existed.”).
96. Jackson, 906 So. 2d at 725.
97. Id. at 728.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Pham v. Continco Int’l., Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 883–84 (La. Ct. App. 5th
2000).
102. Id. at 884.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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seems contrary to its purpose to allow claims against evidence that
was not destroyed, altered, or hidden.
2. The Failure to Produce Evidence Must Impair the Claimant’s
Case
The second element, the heart of spoliation and the reason
claims arise, is the failure to produce evidence.106 Yet, there is often
an unmentioned sub-element related to this requirement: The failure
to produce the evidence must impair the claimant’s case.107 Without
impairment of the claimant’s case, spoliation is not actionable.108
In Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s failure to
produce evidence did not impair the plaintiff’s claim.109 In this case,
Mrs. Arnold slipped and fell on broken eggs in the aisle of a grocery
store.110 Mrs. Arnold alleged spoliation because the employees
cleaned up the eggs before the manager could photograph them.111
The defendants did not contest the presence of the eggs.112 Because
there were three people who admittedly saw the floor and eggs, the
court found that a photograph was unnecessary, though it would
have been helpful.113 Ultimately, the suit was dismissed.114 Further,
in Crittion v. State, the Second Circuit established that a spoliation
claim is meritless if the party had a significant amount of time to
utilize the evidence in question before it was destroyed.115
106. Desselle v. Jefferson Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La. Ct. App.
5th 2004) (“The theory of ‘spoliation of evidence’ refers to an intentional
destruction of evidence for purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use.”);
Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 1362 (La.
Ct. App. 4th 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring) (“Essential to the fabric of the
construction is the citizen’s right of access to the evidence necessary to prove his
case . . . .”). See Roby & Carter, supra note 61.
107. Daotheuang v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 940 So. 2d 752, 756–57 (La.
Ct. App. 2d 2006) (The adverse presumption operates under the notion that the
lack of evidence “has impaired the party’s ability to institute or prove a civil claim
due to negligent or intentional spoliation of evidence.” (quoting McCool v.
Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 So. 2d 116, 118 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2002))).
108. Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d 1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2009).
109. Id. at 1280.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1281.
113. Id.
114. Id. (“[C]lean-up of the mess did not impair the plaintiff’s cause of action
. . . .”).
115. See Critton v. State, 986 So. 2d 207, 209−10 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2008). The
plaintiff in Critton asserted a claim for spoliation because the DOTD paved over
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According to the Critton court, even if it can be shown that the
defendant destroyed the evidence in question, if the plaintiff had
ample time to utilize the evidence for its own purposes and failed to
do so, the claim will fail.116
3. An “Adequate” Explanation for the Failure to Produce
Evidence Will Defeat a Spoliation Claim
Next, the courts generally evaluate whether the defendant’s
affirmative defense can “adequately” explain the absence of the
evidence.117 What has been allowed to pass as an “adequate
explanation” varies greatly.118 In Wilhite v. Thompson, Geraldine
Wilhite’s family brought a medical malpractice case against Dr.
LeFleur and Dr. Thompson.119 Throughout the course of discovery,
neither doctor could provide Mr. Wilhite’s medical chart.120 Dr.
Thompson explained the nonproduction of the chart by claiming that
he was unable to find it after he handed it over to his office
manager.121 The court found this explanation adequate and, thus, did
not find an adverse presumption necessary.122 Further, the court
supported this conclusion by noting that the “testimony depicts the
good faith efforts made by [d]efendants to make the chart available

the section of the roadway where the plaintiff’s daughter was involved in an
accident. Id. The DOTD resurfaced the roadway two years after the lawsuit was
filed. Id. In the three years after the accident, plaintiff failed to have any test
conducted on the condition of the road. Id. The court declined to award the
plaintiff an adverse presumption. Id.
116. Id.
117. See McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208,
2010 WL 3822225, at *6 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010); Gladney v. Milam,
911 So. 2d 366, 369 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005); Hebert v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892, 905
(La. Ct. App. 3d 2011); Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct.
App. 4th 2004); Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524,
534 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2004).
118. Compare McCleary, 2010 WL 3822225, at *6, with Babineaux v. Blake,
396 So. 2d at 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3rd 1981), Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d
493, 498−99 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007), and Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d
771, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006).
119. Wilhite, 962 So. 2d at 497.
120. Id. at 497.
121. Id. at 498 (“Dr. Thompson testified that he last saw the chart when he
handed it to his office manager after receiving notice of the malpractice claim. He
instructed her to secure the chart. Both Defendants testified that, in 2001, their
clinic had thousands of records. Dr. Thompson also testified that he instructed his
staff to search the office for the missing chart without success.”).
122. Id. at 499.
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to [p]laintiffs during this litigation.”123 Not only did the court inject
a “good faith” standard, which had not previously existed, but it also
ignored the statute that expressly requires a physician to preserve
medical records for six years after the patient’s last visit.124 Thus,
Wilhite provides some indication that courts may be willing to find
an excuse “adequate” when the behavior contributing to the loss of
evidence is otherwise negligent.
In Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., the court also found that the
defendant’s testimony adequately explained the absence of needed
evidence.125 In Lewis, the plaintiff was injured when a lawn chair on
display in the Albertson’s store collapsed.126 After the accident, “the
chair at issue was retained by Albertson’s for a number of
months.”127 The discovery phase of the subsequent lawsuit
established that “the chair was mistakenly thrown away by an
Albertson’s employee who was cleaning out the closet that stored
the item.”128 Subsequently, “an effort was made to find a chair
similar to the previous one.”129 At this point, the plaintiffs amended
their petition to include spoliation.130 The court found that this
explanation was enough to defeat the intentional spoliation claim.131
In addition to the preceding cases, a common theme among
other cases where courts accept an explanation as adequate is the
fact that the defendant had reason to believe that the matter at hand
was previously resolved.132 This was the case in both McCleary v.
Terrebone Parish Consolidated Government and Babineaux v.
Black.133
123. Id. at 498.
124. Id.
125. Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 774 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2006).
126. Id. at 772.
127. Id. at 774.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 773.
131. Id. at 774.
132. McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010
WL 3822225, at *6 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010). The plaintiffs in McCleary
alleged spoliation over the defendants’ failure to preserve a file the plaintiffs
wished to review. Id. The defendants noted that as far as they were aware, the
“matter had been finally and definitively adjudicated with the supreme court’s writ
denial in 1998.” Id. The court explicitly deemed this as an adequate explanation
for the defendants’ failure to produce the documents. Id. See also Babineaux v.
Black, 396 So. 2d 584, 586 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1981) (finding no spoliation and
stating that “[w]hen the engine was discarded . . . the defendants obviously
thought that installing the new engine would solve the problem to plaintiff’s
satisfaction”).
133. McCleary, 2010 WL 3822225, at *6; Babineaux, 396 So. 2d at 586.
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If the court finds the defendant’s explanation adequate, it will
deny the spoliation claim.134 Unfortunately, there is no set standard
by which courts evaluate these explanations. The idea of an
“adequate explanation” is murky, but the haze surrounding the
element of intent, analyzed next, is even worse.
C. Intentional or Negligent Conduct
The most debated aspect of spoliation in Louisiana is the
requisite level of intent.135 All of the state appellate courts have
recognized intentional spoliation as actionable, but the courts largely
disagree on whether to recognize a claim for negligent spoliation.136
Normally, this type of disagreement in a state is deemed a “circuit
split.” However, this term does not accurately reflect the state’s
spoliation problem. This is circuit chaos. The three prominent
viewpoints of spoliation found in the courts’ analyses do not
conform to the circuit boundaries.137 It is true that some circuits are
largely internally consistent in their approach, such as the Louisiana
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.138 On the other hand, the cases
from the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pay no more
attention to the circuit’s own prior cases than they do to cases of any
other Louisiana appellate court.139
Not only do the courts disagree on whether to recognize
negligent spoliation, but those that do recognize negligent spoliation
also disagree as to the source of the duty to preserve evidence.140
Through this disagreement, three prominent lines of reasoning have
surfaced in the Louisiana appellate courts: 1) those courts that only
recognize intentional spoliation; 2) the Carter camp, which cites the
duty as originating under a statutory or contractual obligation;141 and

134. See, e.g., Babineaux, 396 So. 2d at 586 (citing Monk v. Monk, 144 So. 2d
384 (La. 1962)); Veillon v. Sylvester, 174 So. 2d 189 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1965).
135. See Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09–0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2 (W.D.
La. Dec. 14, 2011) (“The Louisiana Circuit courts are split as to whether or not the
act of spoliation must be intentional.”).
136. Id.
137. See infra Part II.C.1–3.
138. See infra Part II.C.1.
139. Compare Little v. Boston Scientific Corp., 8 So. 3d 591 (La. Ct. App. 5th
2009) (reverting back to recognizing only intentional spoliation despite previous
cases from the Fifth Circuit that recognized negligent spoliation), with Robertson
v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669, 673–74 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2009)
(recognizing negligent spoliation on the same day Little was decided).
140. See infra Part II.C.1–3.
141. See McCleary v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208,
2010 WL 3822225, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010); Harris v. St. Tammany
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3) the Bethea camp, which cites the duty as originating under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.142
1. Intentional Only—Refusal to Recognize Negligent Spoliation
The strongest proponent of recognizing only intentional forms of
spoliation is the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Fourth Circuit has had a very steady line approach of endorsing only
intentional acts of spoliation as punishable.143 In 1992, the Williams
v. General Motors Corp. court discussed the duty that a party owes
to the claimant in a spoliation case but did not expressly state that
negligent claims are allowed.144 Then, the influential case of
Kammerer v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans required
intentional destruction of evidence for a successful spoliation
claim.145 Subsequently, Quinn v. RISO Investment, Inc. explicitly
endorsed only intentional claims.146 This line of holdings, which
requires intentional conduct for a spoliation claim, has been
consistently followed within the Fourth Circuit.147 Although this
circuit has a clear standard, the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits do
not.
In Randolph v. General Motor Corp., following the Fourth
Circuit’s lead, the First Circuit adopted an intent requirement for
spoliation.148 The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Pham, where the

Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA 0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL
6916523, at *13 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 29, 2011).
142. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2315 (2013); Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs.,
Inc., 704 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 3d 1997) (“Although there is no statutory duty
imposed on the defendants in this case to preserve the evidence and avoid
hindering plaintiffs’ claim, we find a duty exists under La.Civ.Code art. 2315.”);
Robertson, 7 So. 3d at 673.
143. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357
(La. Ct. App. 4th 1994); Quinn v. RISO Invs., Inc. 869 So. 2d 922, 927 (La. Ct.
App. 4th 2004); Everhardt v. LA Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 978 So. 2d 1036, 1045
(La. Ct. App. 4th 2008); Williams v. Bickham, No. 2008-CA-0820, 2009 WL
282731, at *1 (La. Ct. App. 4th Jan. 28, 2009).
144. 607 So. 2d 695, 697 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1992) (citing Fischer v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 429 So. 2d 538 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1983); Duhe v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
635 F. Supp. 1414 (E.D. La. 1986)).
145. Kammerer, 633 So. 2d 1357.
146. Quinn, 869 So. 2d at 927 (“Allegations of negligent conduct are
insufficient.”).
147. See id.; Everhardt, 978 So. 2d at 1045; Williams, 2009 WL 282731, at *1.
148. Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027 (La. Ct. App
1st 1994) (“We find that the trial court imposition of liability upon the Parish
under the theory of spoliation of evidence was clearly wrong since the record does
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court held that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements to
establish a cause of action because he had not pled an intentional
tort.149 In Little v. Boston Scientific Corp., the Fifth Circuit
supported only intentional spoliation.150 The Fifth Circuit decided
Little on the same day as Robertson, another case within the same
circuit, which supported negligent spoliation.151 This exemplifies the
indecisiveness toward the recognition of negligent spoliation. Later
cases from both the Fifth and First Circuits support the intentionalspoliation-only doctrine.152 With the exception of the Second
Circuit, cases that support only intentional spoliation can be found in
the remaining four circuits.153
Overall, there is a large amount of jurisprudence to support this
first line of holdings that dictates that the courts should not
recognize negligent spoliation.154 This approach is a continuation of
the traditional common law notion of spoliation. It continues to
equate the destruction of evidence with the purpose of
disadvantaging the other party in the trial. The doctrine of
spoliation, however, has now grown to recognize the economic
harm caused by the lack of evidence.155 The intentional-only
approach stubbornly ignores this evolution.

not indicate there was an intentional destruction of evidence by the Parish for the
purpose of depriving the opposing parties of its use.”).
149. Pham v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 884 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000).
150. Little v. Boston Scientific Corp., 8 So. 3d 591, 601 (La. Ct. App 5th
2009).
151. Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669 (La. Ct. App.
5th 2009).
152. Barthel v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 917 So. 2d 15, 20 (La. Ct. App.
1st 2005); Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721, 728 (La. Ct. App. 1st
2005); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Queen’s Mach. Co., Ltd., 8 So. 3d 91, 97–98 (La.
Ct. App. 5th 2009) (dismissing claim of spoliation because the court found that
Queen’s “failed to allege that either Zurich or Alpine intentionally destroyed the
evidence”); Kemp v. CTL Distrib., Inc., No. 10-31132, 440 F. App’x 240, 247
(5th Cir. 2011) (“We further explicitly rejected the argument that spoliation of
evidence ‘may also be based on the negligent destruction of evidence.’” (citation
omitted)).
153. Barthel, 917 So. 2d at 20; Arnold v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 10 So. 3d
1279, 1281 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2009); Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New
Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357, 1358 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994); Little, 8 So. 3d at 601.
154. See supra notes 148, 151–52 and cases cited therein.
155. See Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698, 704 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995);
Pham v. Continco Int’l., Inc., 759 So. 2d 880, 883 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000) (stating
that Workers’ Compensation does not “shield the employer from a claim for
economic injury that the employee may suffer as a result of the employer’s postaccident conduct that may impair the employee’s ability to recover tort damages
for his injuries from third parties”).
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2. The Carter Camp—An Express Duty
Carter v. Exide Corp. established a second line of holdings on
how Louisiana should approach negligent spoliation, in addition to
the intentional-only line.156 Unique at the time, Carter mandated
that the defending party must have a specific duty to preserve the
evidence.157 In recognizing negligent spoliation, the court realized
that other jurisdictions consistently held that the plaintiff had to
show that the defendant breached “something more than the general
tort duty to act reasonably under the circumstances.”158 In this case,
the court found that the defendant could have a duty to preserve the
evidence because he had explicitly promised the plaintiff he would
do so.159 Synthesizing past decisions on similar causes of action, the
court pronounced the duty to preserve evidence for negligent
spoliation as arising from “a statute, a contract, a special relationship
between the parties, or an affirmative agreement or undertaking to
preserve the evidence.”160 Carter laid the groundwork for other
cases to accept negligent spoliation, at least in cases involving a
statutory or contractual duty or special relationship.161
In the First Circuit, the court in McCleary v. Terrebone Parish
Consolidated Government characterized the duty needed for
negligent torts as one that arises out of the “foreseeability of the
need for the evidence in the future.”162 This interpretation combined
the “duty” element with the “knowledge of future lawsuit” element.
Nonetheless, McCleary characterized the pertinent question as one
of whether the defendant had a duty “‘arising from a statute, a
contract, a special relationship between the parties, or an affirmative
agreement or undertaking to preserve the evidence.’”163 Harris v. St.
Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 1 expanded this line

156. Carter, 661 So. 2d 698.
157. Id. at 705.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 700. The court ultimately allowed Carter 15 days to “amend his
petition to allege with more particularity his claim against Firestone for failing to
preserve the battery remains in accord with our discussion of this issue.” Id. at
705.
160. Id. at 704. Further, as an economic injury, this cause of action would
pierce the shield of Workers’ Compensation exclusivity. Id.
161. See infra notes 169, 181.
162. McCleary v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov’t, No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010
WL 3822225, at *3 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010).
163. Id. (quoting Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So.
2d 1100, 1104–05 (La. Ct. App. 5th. 2007)). Because the court found that this was
not met, the plaintiff had no remedy. Id.
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of reasoning and analysis.164 In Harris, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals allowed for recovery of a negligent act if an express duty
existed.165 The court discussed the duty needed as one “under a
theory of general negligence” but further defined the duty needed as
statutory or contractual.166 Here, despite efforts to equate the duty of
negligent spoliation with Louisiana’s general tort duty, the court
simply followed the “statutory duty” rule promulgated by Carter.167
In Carter, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals was
one of the first Louisiana jurisdictions to recognize a claim for
negligent spoliation.168 Almost all of the Second Circuit’s cases
discussing spoliation have upheld negligent spoliation.169 Cases
from other circuits are slowly following suit, though the other
circuits as a whole do not consistently support this approach.
In the Third Circuit, the McCool v. Beauregard Memorial
Hospital and Daotheuang v. El Paso Production Oil & Gas Co.
courts recognized a statutory or contractual duty, straying from a
Third Circuit case that placed the source of the duty in Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315.170 In McCool, the Third Circuit explicitly
recognized a negligent cause of action for spoliation, necessitating a
statutory duty.171 The Daotheuang court followed suit.172
Unlike the Third Circuit, which has some consistency, the Fifth
Circuit’s holdings are erratic. It was not until 2007 that a court in the
164. Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA
0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 6916523, at *15 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 29, 2011).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *13–15. “[I]n Louisiana, courts have adopted a duty-risk analysis in
determining whether to impose liability under the general negligence principles of
LSA−C.C. art. 2315.” Id. at *14. The court later held that the plaintiff “failed to
show that STPH had a duty to preserve the evidence for plaintiff that arose from
either a statute, a contract, a special relationship between the parties, or an
affirmative agreement or undertaking to preserve the evidence.” Id. at *15. After
explicitly finding that spoliation did not apply here, the court noted that:
Nonetheless, under general negligence principles, we find that STPH had
a duty of care to plaintiff in the handling of the body. . . . STPH owed a
duty to plaintiff to see that the body was sent for autopsy as ordered and
pursuant to its own policies. Clearly, STPH blatantly breached that duty.
Id. The Harris court failed to connect the dots linking this general duty owed and
breached to the theory of spoliation.
168. Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995).
169. Id.; Lewis v. Albertson’s Inc., 935 So. 2d 771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2d
2006); Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007);
Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Nunley, 77 So. 3d 457, 465 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2011).
170. McCool v. Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 So. 2d 116, 119 (La. Ct. App.
3d 2002); Daotheuang v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 940 So. 2d 752, 757 (La.
Ct. App. 3d 2006).
171. McCool, 814 So. 2d at 118–19.
172. Daotheuang, 940 So. 2d at 756–57.
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Fifth Circuit was faced with a spoliation of evidence claim in which
the defendant had a statutory duty to preserve the evidence in
question.173 Until that point, no case within the circuit had allowed
negligent spoliation. The Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hospital
Service District No. 1 decision marked the beginning of an
acceptance of negligent spoliation within the Fifth Circuit.174 In
Longwell, the plaintiffs alleged that West Jefferson Medical Center
(WJMC) was negligent for not saving images taken during an
operation on Karen Longwell.175 Louisiana law required that
electronic images taken by the hospital be retained for three years
after discharge of a patient.176 Here, despite WJMC admitting
negligence in their failure to save the pictures, the trial court granted
WJMC’s summary judgment on the spoliation issue because
Longwell had not alleged or shown the act was intentional.177 When
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated the case, it
found that the plaintiff’s spoliation claim failed under previous
holdings, which required intent.178 However, the court recognized
that the breach of a statutory duty is actionable under a theory of
negligence.179 Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment to
the extent that it was contrary to these findings.180 This case joined
the Carter line of holdings.
The Carter line of reasoning is most strongly associated with the
Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals, but it is not exclusive to
this circuit.181 This approach created a middle ground between the
idea of only recognizing intentional spoliation and recognizing any
negligent acts that may have led to spoliation. As such, many courts
favor this approach because it offers a remedy without imposing a
large burden on society to constantly consider what may be needed
as evidence in the future.

173. Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 2d 1100
(La. Ct. App. 5th 2007).
174. Id. at 1106 (“We find the present case distinguishable from Desselle in
that WJMC had a statutory duty to preserve the plaintiff’s records which, when
breached, became actionable under a theory of negligence.”).
175. Id. at 1103.
176. Id. at 1102; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144 (2008).
177. Longwell, 970 So. 2d at 1104.
178. Id. at 1106.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007); Hebert
v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892 (La. Ct. App. 3d 2011); Pham v. Contico Int’l, Inc., 759
So. 2d 880, 883 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000).
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3. The Bethea Camp—A General Tort Duty
The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals is the birthplace
of the third line of holdings.182 The Bethea v. Modern Biomedical
Services court championed this approach, redefining the concept of
a defendant’s duty in a spoliation claim and ignoring Carter.183 The
Bethea court turned to Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 and held
that the duty to preserve evidence was found in general tort
liability, not a specific statute or agreement.184 The court reasoned
as follows:
Intentionally hindering a plaintiff’s civil claim when there
is no statutory duty to prevent this action is just as violative
of our civilian notion of justice and fair play as when a
statutory duty is imposed. For purposes of this issue, this
court fails to see the benefit of making a distinction
between a specific statutory duty and the far-reaching duty
La.Civ.Code art. 2315 imposes.185
The holding eliminated the need for a specific duty to be
identified.186 This lessened the plaintiff’s burden of proving
negligent spoliation. Yet, many circuits and cases chose to avoid
this avenue.187
The Third Circuit does not consistently follow Bethea. Later
cases from the circuit have, at times, endorsed all three lines of
holdings. 188 The next case to discuss spoliation in the Third Circuit,
182. Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs. Inc., 704 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App.
3d 1997).
183. See id. at 1233.
184. Id. (“Although there is no statutory duty imposed on the defendants in this
case to preserve the evidence and avoid hindering plaintiffs’ claim, we find a duty
exists under La.Civ.Code art. 2315. The absence of a statutory duty is not
tantamount to no duty. The parameters of what constitutes fault in Louisiana reach
far and wide in order to hold people accountable for their harmful actions
regardless of whether or not their actions are covered by a statutory provision.”).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Barthel v. State Dep’t. of Transp. & Dev., 917 So. 2d 15, 21 (La.
Ct. App. 1st 2005); Smith v. Jitney Jungle of Am., 802 So. 2d 988, 994 (La. Ct.
App. 2d 2001); Guillory v. Dillard’s Dep’t. Store, Inc., 777 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 2000); Quinn v. RISO Invs, Inc., 869 So. 2d 922, 926–27 (La. Ct. App.
4th 2004); Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La.
Ct. App. 5th 2004).
188. See Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs., 704 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 1997); McCool v. Beauregard Mem’l Hosp., 814 So. 2d 116, 119 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 2002); Daotheuang v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 940 So. 2d 752, 757
(La. Ct. App. 3d 2006); Hebert v. Richard, 72 So. 3d 892, 905 (La. Ct. App. 3d
2011).
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Guillory v. Dillard’s Department Store, Inc., took no notice of
Bethea.189 Despite laying the foundation for a general tort duty in
the analysis, the court did not accept the plaintiff’s argument that
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 set forth the duty to preserve the
evidence.190 However, the court may have dismissed the spoliation
claim because the court found that the defendant was unaware of the
alleged tort and the probability of a future lawsuit.191 Regardless,
this case only added to the confusion. The subsequent spoliation
cases in the Third Circuit reverted back to the Carter notion of a
more specific duty.192
However, Bethea was not forgotten. The Fifth Circuit in
Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods returned to the Bethea
notion of a general tort duty.193 By citing Bethea, the court held that
claims of negligent spoliation were allowed without a statutory or
express duty.194 “It has been held that a duty to preserve evidence
can exist without the imposition of a statutory duty.”195 This holding
rooted the duty for negligent spoliation in article 2315.196
189. Guillory, 777 So. 2d at 4. It merely noted that when damage results from a
party destroying evidence, the exact name of the claim was of little importance. Id.
“[W]e believe that it is of little importance here, to determine an exact title to label
plaintiff’s claim for damages resulting from the acts alleged; for when a plaintiff
alleges sufficient facts which indicate that he or she has suffered damages caused
by another’s fault, that plaintiff has asserted a claim actionable under Louisiana
tort law.” Id.
190. Id. (“The plaintiff alleges that pursuant to La.Civ.Code. art. 2315, a duty
was imposed on Dillard’s to preserve the keys on which Ms. Guillory allegedly
slipped and fell. . . . Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to show that Dillard’s had a
duty to preserve the set of keys, simply because Ms. Guillory claimed she slipped
and fell on them while in the department store.”).
191. Id. at 6 (“We find nothing to suggest that at the time Dillard’s received the
keys and was notified of Ms. Guillory’s accident under either account, it was
under a legal duty to preserve the keys which belonged to an unknown person.”).
192. See, e.g., McCool, 814 So. 2d at 119; Daotheuang, 940 So. 2d at 757;
Hebert, 72 So. 3d at 905.
193. Robertson v. Frank’s Super Value Foods, Inc., 7 So. 3d 669, 673–74 (La.
Ct. App. 5th 2009).
194. Id. (“In considering the defendant’s exception of no cause of action on the
latter claims, the court examined the issue under La. C.C. art. 2315 and it dictates
that ‘[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it.’ In finding that the plaintiff did state a cause
of action for negligent and/or intentional spoliation of evidence in the absence of a
statutory duty, the court recognized that each individual is accountable for his or
her actions as they affect fellow members of society.”).
195. Id. Though the court said “statutory duty,” it seemed as though it meant a
duty other than those designated by Carter (“a statute, a contract, a special
relationship between the parties, or an affirmative agreement or undertaking to
preserve the evidence”) could be upheld. See Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d
698, 704 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995).
196. Robertson, 7 So. 3d at 673–74.
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In sum, there is a large and apparent disagreement within the
Louisiana circuit courts on the issue of spoliation of evidence. The
lines that distinguish the varying viewpoints do not neatly coincide
with the circuits themselves as a “circuit split” would. There is no
consistent theme of what elements must be met for a successful
claim or what levels of culpability and fault are needed.197 While the
courts agree on some aspects, such as knowledge of the impending
lawsuit, they are divided on whether to recognize negligent
spoliation and, if so, where the duty for this delict originates.198 This
muddled doctrine has led to bad case precedent and results.199 The
Louisiana Supreme Court or Louisiana Legislature should answer
the circuit chaos. The following Part suggests certain elements for
the tort of spoliation that are in line with civilian tradition, uphold
the integrity of the court system and Louisiana’s contract and
statutory law, and are consistent with the concepts of equity and
truth.
III. THE GOOD WITCH DELIVERS AN IDEAL SET OF ELEMENTS FOR
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
The Louisiana Supreme Court or the Louisiana Legislature
should establish the elements of spoliation and the burden of proof
needed to succeed on the merits of a claim. At minimum, the Carter
theory of negligent spoliation should be adopted in order to protect
the integrity of Louisiana’s contract and statutory law.200 Further,
equity, judicial integrity, and the concepts of truth and fairness
support the adoption of the Bethea theory, at least in limited
circumstances. In recognizing a cause of action for negligent
spoliation, Louisiana would be a progressive leader among its sister
states.201
A. Party Knew or Reasonably Should Have Known of the Future
Lawsuit
The first element of spoliation should consider whether the
defending party knew or reasonably should have known that a
lawsuit would likely ensue. The idea that a court must evaluate
197. Bertrand v. Fischer, No. 09–0076, 2011 WL 6254091, at *2 (W.D. La.
Dec. 14, 2011) (“The Louisiana Circuit courts are split as to whether or not the act
of spoliation must be intentional.”).
198. Id.
199. See Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 496–98 (La. Ct. App. 2d
2007).
200. See infra Part III.C.
201. See supra Part I.B.
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whether a party “should have known” about a future lawsuit
automatically carries with it an objective reasonableness standard.202
It should not suffice for an accused party to merely state that he or
she was unaware of a pending or likely suit and thus avoid
accountability for destruction of evidence. Because of the incentive
to be dishonest, courts should expressly walk through an objective
analysis—considering facts and circumstances, rather than weighing
only testimony—when determining whether the party had
knowledge. Following the standard set by Texas jurisprudence, the
courts should analyze “whether a reasonable person would conclude
from the severity of the accident and other circumstances
surrounding it that there was a substantial chance for litigation.”203
Utilization of this standard will ensure these cases uphold the
principles of truth and fairness upon which the judicial system is
based.
This objective reasonableness approach was implicitly utilized by
a Louisiana court in Randolph.204 In Randolph, the trial court
discussed whether the Terrebone Parish Consolidated Government
(TPCG) should have anticipated a future lawsuit.205 Finding that the
TPCG knew the plaintiff had injured himself and that the cause of the
injury was a malfunctioning piece of TPCG’s equipment, TPCG “had
enough information for it to know or presume that some type of claim
for either workman’s compensation, medical reimbursement, and/or
personal injuries may [have been] made by Mr. Randolph.”206 The
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with
this conclusion and overruled the trial court.207 Despite the awareness
of the plaintiff’s injuries, the First Circuit reasoned that any
expectation of a future suit was diminished by the fact that the
plaintiff returned to “work within a few days and worked without
interruption for over seven months.”208 Further bolstering the court of
appeals’s decision to disallow the plaintiff’s spoliation claim was the
fact that the plaintiff did not file suit until almost one year after the
accident and did not request to inspect the faulty equipment until
202. WILLIAM SHELBY MCKENZIE & H. ALSTON JOHNSON III, INSURANCE
LAW & PRACTICE § 5:5, in 15 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 448 (4th ed. 2012)
(“[T]he traditional tort inquiry that asks what consequences an objective
reasonable person might expect from a deliberate act.”).
203. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL
2982902, at *6 (Tex. App. July 30, 2010).
204. Randolph v. General Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1027−28 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 1994).
205. Id. at 1027.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1028.
208. Id.
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even later than that.209 Despite the differing conclusions of the trial
and appellate courts, both objectively evaluated the circumstances in
order to establish whether it was likely that TPCG should have
known litigation was probable. This is an example of a court openly
evaluating the facts and circumstances to determine whether the
party had knowledge of the impending suit. This type of discussion
thwarts efforts of the defendants to avoid liability by falsely stating
that they were not aware of the likelihood of litigation. An objective
evaluation would uphold the integrity of our judicial system and
refrain from implicitly condoning a defendant’s dishonesty.
B. Party Fails to Produce Evidence
The second element of spoliation should be the failure of the
defending party to produce the needed evidence. The three subrequirements to this element are that: (1) the evidence existed at one
time, (2) the absence of the evidence impairs the plaintiff’s case, and
(3) the defendant lacks an adequate explanation for the absence.
These requirements are associated with the purpose of spoliation
claims: to compensate the plaintiff for the economic injury to his or
her suit due to the lack of requested evidence. This is the heart of the
cause of action.
1. Evidence Must Have Previously Existed
It is perfectly logical that one cannot destroy or hide evidence
that never existed; however, below the surface of this element lies
injustice. Facially, the Jackson210 decision was sound in holding that
a party could not be charged with spoliating an accident report
merely because the party failed to create it. But when applying this
requirement to other situations, the outcome is inequitable.
In certain situations, the failure to create evidence should be
actionable because society would expect those materials, such as an
autopsy report, to be produced. Hence, an exception should be
recognized. If a plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that
documentation was being created in the normal course of business
and the lack of documentation drastically hinders the plaintiff’s
case, spoliation should be allowed in cases where the evidence never
existed.

209. Id.
210. Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721 (La. Ct. App. 1st 2005).
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The need for an exception to this rule is exemplified in Harris v.
St. Tammany Parish Hospital Service District No. 1.211 In Harris,
Mrs. Harris suddenly died while she was being transported from an
operating room to a care unit.212 Subsequently, Dr. Breaux ordered
an autopsy in order to determine the cause of death.213 The plaintiff,
Mr. Harris, also requested an autopsy of his wife.214 The hospital
sent the body straight to a funeral home rather than to a coroner, and
the autopsy never took place.215 Under the false impression that an
autopsy had taken place, Mrs. Harris was embalmed, making an
autopsy impossible.216 After the death, “an Adverse Drug Reaction
Form was anonymously completed by [St. Tammany Parish
Hospital] indicating that [a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist]
had administered 50 milligrams of Brevibloc to Mrs. Harris and that
the drug reaction was ‘severe.’”217 Mr. Harris filed suit against the
hospital for negligence, including “contributing to the spoliation
and/or destruction of evidence, including toxicology screen, blood
work and other post-mortem diagnostic testing, which would have
been undertaken and would have disclosed the cause of death had
[the hospital] not released the body to Fielding [Funeral Home].”218
Under these facts, refusing recovery to Mr. Harris in his
spoliation claim because an autopsy report was never created is
contrary to the theory of spoliation. Spoliation is centered on the
economic hindrance to a party’s claim by the actions of the
defendant.219 The law does not want to give defending parties an
incentive to hide evidence in order to be successful on a claim.220
Nevertheless, the law should not disincentivize the creation of
evidence, especially if it is procedural documentation in the normal
course of business. Although it seems likely that Mrs. Harris had an
adverse reaction to the drug administered to her, without an autopsy
report this would be very difficult to prove. The lack of an autopsy
report was a severe impairment to Mr. Harris’s case, and accordingly,
211. Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA
0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 6916523 (La. Ct. App. 1st Dec. 29, 2011).
212. Id. at *1.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(“We appreciate that one who has suffered a legally recognized injury is usually
entitled to an award of damages.”).
220. Id. at 834–35 (“False testimony and subornation of perjury occur during
the trial and do adversely affect the public at large by interfering with the judicial
process as well as impacting on an individual plaintiff.”).
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he should have been allowed to apply the theory of spoliation of
evidence. The court admitted that the hospital was negligent in the
handling of the body and had a duty to Mr. Harris to handle the
body with care, yet it failed to find a claim for spoliation.221
Therefore, the courts should allow spoliation of evidence claims
in select cases where it is apparent that the defendant’s failure to
create evidence, which the plaintiff could have reasonably expected
to have been created, impaired the claim. This exception should
center around the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation that certain
evidence exists.222 If the defendant would reasonably be expected to
document transactions, whether by writing receipts, using security
cameras, or taking notes, the plaintiff should not be deprived of
these items because the defendant intentionally or negligently failed
to document an occurrence. It is reasonable for a party to expect that
banks have security cameras recording what happens on their
premises or that a lawyer would document monetary damages while
holding them for his client. These are routine and expected
examples of documentation.
Allowing claims of spoliation in cases where intent or
negligence causes a failure to create documentation might deter
entities from routinely documenting events. This argument is similar
to the reasoning behind the “work product” doctrine, a principle
found in evidence law.223 In creating the work product doctrine to
protect a lawyer’s notes from being subjected to scrutiny, the U.S.
Supreme Court sought to avoid deterring lawyers from writing out
their thoughts and strategies for a particular case.224 Although wellfounded, this principle does not present a real-world threat to the
221. Harris, 2011 WL 6916523, at *15.
222. See Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Nunley, 77 So. 3d 457, 464 (La. Ct.
App. 2d 2011). Acadian attempted to obtain a servitude over the Nunleys’
property through a judicial decree in order to install a natural gas pipeline. Id. at
459–60. In an attempt to refrain from having the servitude granted, the Nunleys
argued that the route chosen was done so “arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith.”
Id. at 461. The Nunleys claimed spoliation for the defendant’s failure to produce
hard data supporting its route selection process. Id. Such data had not been
produced in the first place. Id. This was accepted as an adequate explanation
despite the fact that the plaintiff’s expert testified that “in a project of this size,
failure to document the route selection process would be engineering malpractice.”
Id. at 465.
223. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
224. Id. at 510−11 (“Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is
bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the
rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. . . . Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put
down in writing would remain unwritten.”).
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routine creation of documents in the ordinary course of business. It
would be impractical for a coroner to never write an autopsy report
but merely relay the findings orally. It would not be feasible for
insurance companies to only enter into oral contracts with their
insureds. Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that an entity has a duty
to tender documentation where the plaintiff would reasonably expect
it to be routinely produced. Therefore, in limited circumstances,
Louisiana should allow spoliation claims in cases where the relevant
evidence never existed.
2. The Failure to Produce Evidence Must Impair the Claimant’s
Case
A spoliation claim should only be successful if the missing
evidence in some way impairs the plaintiff’s case. Nevertheless,
because tort liability allows for varying ranges of damages and fault,
it should not be necessary that the missing evidence is the threshold
for the case in order to be actionable. If the missing evidence does
not bar the party from recovery but merely reduces the judgment
amount, the plaintiff should be allowed to recoup the amount by
which the spoliation diminished the recovery. Thus, if a party is
rendered a judgment of $50,000 but would have been granted
$150,000 if a key piece of evidence had been present, the plaintiff
suffered a loss despite the award of damages. Because economic
injury is the basis for spoliation, claims should be allowed where it
can be shown that the missing evidence decreased a judgment
recovered by the plaintiff.
3. An “Adequate” Explanation for the Failure to Produce
Evidence Will Defeat a Spoliation Claim
While an adverse presumption can be rebutted by explaining the
circumstance surrounding the act,225 tort liability should not be
absolved by a mere explanation of what led to the present damages.
Louisiana jurisprudence has failed to clearly distinguish between a
cause of action for the tort of spoliation and a request for an adverse
presumption based on spoliation.226 Because the two remedies are
225. See Roby & Carter, supra note 61, at 224.
226. See, e.g., Randolph v. Gen. Motors Corp., 646 So. 2d 1019, 1026 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 1994). Though the Randolph court only talked about the adverse
presumption, after finding the third party liable for spoliation, the trial court
imposed 50% liability on the party. Id. at 1023. This is not a presumption. In
McCleary, despite the fact that the plaintiffs sought damages for spoliation as a
separate tort action, the court discussed the adverse presumption and what is
needed. McCleary v. Terrebone Parish Consol. Gov’t., No. 2009 CA 2208, 2010
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entangled in courts’ analyses, the courts consider defendants’
explanations when faced with the tort of spoliation. While applying
this “affirmative defense” to the tort of spoliation is incorrect, it is
important for a practicing lawyer to be aware of the courts’ actions.
Any story as to why evidence cannot be produced should not be
adequate to overcome an adverse presumption or monetary damages
for impairment of a claim. This incentivizes defendants to lie and
undermines the integrity of spoliation claims. The Wilhite case,
which held the doctor’s explanation of the missing medical chart
adequate, is a bad model for the growth of Louisiana’s doctrine.227
The court allowed a doctor to merely state that a nurse had lost the
file.228 Not only did the doctor have a statutory duty to maintain
medical records, but his explanation lacked any corroboration.229
Regardless of the truth of the doctor’s explanation, setting the bar so
low as to what will alleviate a party from liability will incentivize
future parties to recite a similar story that includes negligence, then
an unsuccessful effort to find the lost evidence. Thus, every claim
would be defeated immediately with such a story, and this would
undermine the theory of spoliation. The courts should place a high
burden on what is considered an “adequate” explanation because
this defense obliterates the plaintiff’s recovery.
A high burden does not necessarily mean an impossible burden.
In fact, many explanations may reasonably justify the absence of
evidence, such as the fact that the evidence was destroyed during
part of routine business practice. Such was the explanation in
Kammerer.230 The evidence in question, a manhole cover, was the
property of and maintained by the Sewage and Water Board of New
Orleans.231 After replacing the cover, the “cover in question was
immediately destroyed by employees of the defendant.”232 This was
normal procedure that was “implemented as a safety precaution.”233
WL 3822225, at *1–2 (La. Ct. App. 1st Sept. 30, 2010). The court then found
spoliation was not present because the explanation of the party was “adequate.” Id.
at *6. This confuses the tort and adverse presumption. In Harris, the plaintiffs
sought damages for spoliation under the tort. Harris v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp.
Serv. Dist. No. 1, Nos. 2011 CA 0941, 2011 CA 0942, 2011 WL 6916523 (La. Ct.
App. 1st 2011). Yet, the court discussed the adverse presumption and said an
adequate explanation eliminates liability. Id. at 18.
227. Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007).
228. Id.
229. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 40:1299.96(A)(3) (2008).
230. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357
(La. Ct. App. 4th 1994).
231. Id. at 1357.
232. Id. at 1358.
233. Id.
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The supervisor testified that “he had replaced numerous manhole
covers and that none of the other destroyed covers had become the
subject of litigation.”234 The court found that these statements
formed a good basis to accept the explanation as “adequate.”235
Judge Plotkin, dissenting, explained that “obviously, routine
destruction of evidence could be a ‘reasonable explanation’ for a
failure to produce evidence in certain cases. However, [he did] not
believe that this is one of those cases.”236 Judge Plotkin warned that
an exception based on the routine destruction of evidence “provides
a disincentive to the defendant to preserve important evidence and
therefore should not be sanctioned because it is against public
policy.”237
Destruction in the routine course of business might be an
adequate explanation at times. However, the court should look at the
explanation of the defending party in conjunction with the
surrounding factors, such as familiarity with litigation. If it appears,
as it did to Judge Plotkin in Kammerer, that the explanation is
insufficient to justify the actions taken by the defendant and that a
reasonably prudent person in the defendant’s shoes would have
acted differently, then the explanation should not be allowed to
defeat a spoliation claim.
C. Level of Intent
The third element for spoliation is the level of culpability
necessary. All Louisiana circuits accept intentional spoliation.238 As
such, the third element in an intentional spoliation action would be
for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant intentionally destroyed,
altered, or failed to preserve the evidence. At that point, the prima
facie claim for intentional spoliation is complete. However, this is
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1367 (Plotkin, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1368. Also, his finding that the Sewage and Water Board of New
Orleans’s explanation was inadequate came from the familiarity of the defendant
with litigation. Id. “The defendant knew or should have known that the logical
result of an accident involving personal injuries would be the filing of a civil
lawsuit by the injured party. Further, the defendant knew or should have known
that the manhole cover was crucial to the plaintiff’s claim.” Id.
238. Union Pump Co. v. Centrifugal Tech., Inc., Civil Action No. 05-0287,
2009 WL 3015076, at *5 (W.D. La. Sept. 18, 2009) (“All five Louisiana Circuit
Courts of Appeal have recognized spoliation as a valid tort claim. . . . The tort of
spoliation of the evidence is derived from the evidentiary theory of adverse
presumption. In the evidentiary context, the concept of spoliation of the evidence
is defined as an intentional destruction of the evidence for the purpose of depriving
an opposing party of its use.” (citations omitted)).
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nothing new. The more difficult question is whether Louisiana
should recognize negligent spoliation. Accepting negligent
spoliation is progressive because few states have recognized the
tort.239 However, recognition of negligent spoliation is consistent
with Louisiana’s tort law and Civil Code article 2315. The
Louisiana Supreme Court or the Louisiana Legislature should
formally recognize negligent spoliation in order to protect our
citizens and the integrity of our law.
1. Existing Law Supports the Recognition of Negligent
Spoliation
The courts and Legislature need only look to the sound
reasoning of Carter and Bethea to find support for negligent
spoliation claims. However, if these cases themselves are not
persuasive, one need look no further than the general principles of
contract and statutory law, the Louisiana Constitution, and the
Louisiana Civil Code for justification.
a. Negligent Spoliation is Necessary to Uphold the Integrity of
Contract and Statutory Laws
Failing to recognize negligent spoliation, a concept consistent
with Louisiana’s civilian tradition, threatens the integrity of the
State’s statutes and contract law. At the very least, Louisiana should
formally accept the Carter notion that where “a statute, a contract, a
special relationship between the parties, or an affirmative agreement
or undertaking to preserve the evidence” is present, then a duty
exists on behalf of the defendant.240 These duties should be upheld
because they are part of a larger body of law whose stability is
undermined by the failure to accept negligent spoliation. If the
courts do not enforce statutory provisions that require the
maintenance of documents, as was the case in Wilhite, then the
argument to enforce them in other instances is severely
weakened.241 For this reason, it is necessary that Louisiana accept
negligent spoliation where a statutory duty is found in order to
maintain the integrity of its laws. The same idea can be applied to
contracts.
If the courts refuse to enforce a contractual provision requiring a
party to preserve evidence or “an affirmative agreement or
239. See supra Part I.B.
240. Carter v. Exide Corp., 661 So. 2d 698, 704 (La. Ct. App. 2d 1995).
241. Wilhite v. Thompson, 962 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2007).
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undertaking to preserve the evidence,”242 which is essentially an oral
contract, then this will open the door for the unenforceability of
other contractual agreements without a sufficient basis in law or
reason. In contract law, the court will not uphold clauses if they are
illegal, unreasonable, or unjust.243 But that is not the case here. In
some instances, the parties have mutually agreed to form obligations
between them through a document or oral agreement. If these
agreements do not violate existing laws or the rights of either party,
then under sound contract law, they should be upheld.
b. Negligent Spoliation Encompasses the Judicial Integrity and
Fairness for Which the Louisiana Constitution Strives
The Louisiana Constitution supports negligent spoliation. The
Constitution states that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person
shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice,
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for
injury to him in his person, property, reputation or other rights.”244
This clause declares that Louisiana’s judicial system is in place so
that citizens may have a fair adjudication of their claims.245 The
Constitution supports the notion that any hindrance to a citizen
utilizing the judicial system should be eliminated or compensable.
Essential to the fabric of the construction is the citizen’s
right of access to the evidence necessary to prove his case,
without which mere access to the courts would be vain and
useless. . . . Whether judge or jury, the trier of fact’s ability
to accomplish its goals of fairness and truth depends on the
quality of the evidence put before it. . . . Where material
evidence has been lost, the veracity and justice of the
ultimate decision will of necessity suffer. Where that
evidence has been wrongfully and intentionally destroyed,
the injury is not only to the prejudiced party but also to the
justice system itself and to the public’s confidence in that
system.246
242. Carter, 661 So. 2d at 704.
243. See Sanchez v. Commodore Cruise Lines, Ltd., 713 So. 2d 572, 576 (La.
Ct. App. 4th 1998) (citing Lejano v. Bandak, 705 So. 2d 158 (La. 1998)) (“[T]he
Supreme Court held that a forum selection clause should be enforced absent a
clear showing that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the
clause is invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching . . . .”).
244. LA. CONST. art. 1 § 22.
245. Id.
246. Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 633 So. 2d 1357,
1362 (La. Ct. App. 4th 1994) (Waltzer, J., concurring).
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The West Virginia Supreme Court also looked to its state
constitution and the notions of judicial fairness and access to support
the recognition of negligent spoliation.247 In order to maintain the
fairness and confidence in Louisiana’s judicial system that is
discussed in the State’s Constitution, Louisiana should formally
recognize negligent spoliation.
c. Negligent Spoliation Is Supported by the Louisiana Civil Code
Looking to the concepts of fairness and justice, in limited
circumstances, Louisiana should allow the duty for negligent
spoliation to be found in article 2315 as the Bethea court suggests.
Foremost, Louisiana Civil Code article 1757 states that “[o]bligations
arise from contracts and other declarations of will. They also arise
directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will, in instances
such as wrongful acts, the management of the affairs of another,
unjust enrichment and other acts or facts.”248 When a person
negligently destroys evidence that hinders the plaintiff’s claim, then
the source of the obligation is a juridical fact.249 As civilian law very
commonly accepts juridical facts as a source of obligations to other
parties, it should be no different for negligent spoliation. Liability
under tort law is “nonconsensual” and unrelated to “voluntary
undertakings.”250 “Smith [the first case to recognize spoliation in
general] should not be limited to cases in which custodians of
potentially relevant evidence agree to preserve the matter until
trial.”251 The Civil Code is a “solemn expression of legislative
will.”252 Thus, Louisiana endorses imposing tort liability where no
contractual agreement is present.
In recognizing negligent spoliation against third parties, the
Alabama Supreme Court noted that the general principles of
negligence law present in the state were sufficient to support such an
action.253 In the same sense, Louisiana’s article 2315 lays the
foundation for a negligent spoliation claim. Bethea’s motivation for
recognizing a duty under article 2315 for negligent spoliation claims

247. Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 572 (W. Va. 2003).
248. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1757 (2013).
249. ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL: A
PRÉCIS 4 (3d ed. 2006).
250. Lawrence B. Solum & Stepehn J. Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal
Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1102 (1987).
251. Id.
252. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2 (2013) (“Legislation is a solemn expression of
legislative will.”).
253. Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 432 (Ala. 2000).
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is that it is a true representation of Louisiana law.254 Bethea advocates
that the Legislature promulgated article 2315 to cover specific
wrongs that the drafters could not have imagined at the time.255 The
drafters “realized[] no one could foresee all possible types of civil
injuries and accidents that might befall people.”256 Mostly, Bethea
discussed Louisiana’s notion of fault. “The parameters of what
constitutes fault in Louisiana reach far and wide in order to hold
people accountable for their harmful actions regardless of whether
or not their actions are covered by a statutory provision.”257 Having
a broad view of fault allows the courts the discretion to recognize an
obligation arising from a fault previously overlooked.258
The Framers of Louisiana’s Civil Code viewed fault broadly “as
a breach of a preexisting obligation, for which the law orders
reparation, when it causes damage to another, and they left it to the
court to determine in each case the existence of an anterior
obligation which would make an act constitute fault.”259
The idea that fault is a broad concept was not novel to Bethea.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Veazey v. Elmwood Planatation
Associates, Ltd. noted that instead of defining “fault” for every
applicable situation, the Civil Code gives a broad notion, and the
application is left to the courts.260 Veazey looked to the Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise, which states that:
[F]ault is the mirror of our times: what we, people of
Louisiana, decide to be fault, that is fault. As such, fault is a
fluid term definable only with respect to its surroundings and
thus, with the concept of fault, we can incorporate into our
law a new situation without changing our definition of fault:
fault remains the same; it is we, members of society who
change.261

254. Bethea v. Modern Biomedical Servs., 704 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (La. Ct.
App. 3d 1997) (“This court’s understanding and appreciation of the civilian legal
system, and La. Civ. Code art. 2315 in particular, yields a different view than that
espoused by other Louisiana courts on this issue.”).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A EUROPEAN
LEGACY FOR THE UNITED STATES 52 (1993)).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (La.
1988)).
260. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., Ltd., 650 So. 2d 712, 717 (La.
1994).
261. FERDINAND STONE, TORT DOCTRINE § 60, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 84 (1977).
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Article 2315 was purposely construed broadly so that
Louisiana’s delictual law would not become stagnant. As society
changes to find that certain conduct falls below a proper standard,
that fault should become actionable through evolving law.262 “[T]he
Louisiana application of fault in Article 2315 may be described
simply as a legal determination of whether or not one will be made
to repair damage caused by his actions—regardless of whether the
tortfeasor’s damage causing conduct may be considered
imprudent.”263 Louisiana should utilize the safeguard provided in
article 2315 to handle evolving law and find that the act of negligent
spoliation falls below society’s standards of proper conduct.
Article 2315 states that “[e]very act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.”264 This article alone justifies allowing negligent spoliation
claims where no statutory or contractual duty is present because
spoliation causes the plaintiff to suffer harm. However, it is harsh to
mandate that every member of society should, at all times, consider
what may or may not be evidence for some future trial. Therefore,
article 2315 should be used in limited circumstances. These
circumstances may include negligent spoliation by entities or
businesses that for all practical purposes should be familiar with the
frequency of litigation or the Carter notion of “a special relationship
between the parties.” Another circumstance in which article 2315
might be utilized to hold a defendant responsible for negligent
spoliation is a situation of gross negligence in which the defendant’s
actions were so imprudent that it is only fair to grant recovery. For
instance, it was appropriate for Velasco, the California case that first
recognized negligent spoliation, to find that a janitor should not be
held liable under general negligence principles for spoliating
evidence because the janitor threw away a paper bag that contained
a broken bottle.265 Additionally, it was inappropriate for the court in
Gladney v. Milam to find that no spoliation occurred where the
defendant knew of the claims of the allegedly defective Firestone
tire and yet sold the vehicle to a salvage yard, making the tire
unavailable for testing.266 Because the defendant was a national
insurance company and was aware of the allegations, it was grossly
262. Weiland v. King, 281 So. 2d 688, 690 (La. 1973) (“[F]ault is a broad
concept, embracing all conduct falling below a proper standard.”).
263. Mark Fernandez, Case Note, Dual Drilling Co. v. Mills Equipment
Investments, Inc.—A Statement About Conversion or A Statement About the
Concept of Fault?, 60 LA. L. REV. 985, 990–91 (2000).
264. LA CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2013).
265. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504, 506–07
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
266. Gladney v. Milam, 911 So. 2d 366, 368–69 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005).
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negligent in selling the vehicle to a salvage yard. Ultimately, the
Louisiana Supreme Court should articulate a standard for when article
2315 should supplant the statutory or contractual duty requirement in
order to allow for equitable recovery by a plaintiff.
2. Negligent Spoliation Is Equitable
Further, if none of the prior arguments persuade the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the Court should accept negligent spoliation because
it is equitable. Though the defending parties may be doing so
negligently, their failure to use reasonable care that results in
destroyed evidence leads to unjust enrichment at the plaintiffs’
expense.267 To protect plaintiffs from harm, Louisiana should
recognize negligent spoliation in order to uphold the notions of truth
and fairness and eliminate the incentive to lie.
a. Promotes Truth and Fairness
In order to support the principles of fairness in the judicial
proceedings and the truthfulness of the result, a claim for negligent
spoliation should be allowed. “Destruction of evidence undermines
two important goals of the judicial system—truth and fairness . . . .
Destruction of evidence is unfair because it potentially creates
inequality of access to information.”268 Our judicial system operates
under the adversarial system, which is thought to promote true results
because of the incentive each side has “to produce evidence favorable
to its position.”269 When evidence is spoliated, it “stands the
assumption of the adversary system on its head: the parties, instead of
feeding the fact finder all relevant evidence, become engines of
destruction, purging the record of the relevant material that is
favorable to the other side.”270 Allowing a party to be disadvantaged
in litigation due to the actions of another, even if negligent, reduces
the overall fairness of our judicial process. “Controlling destruction of
evidence promotes fairness in the same way that liberal discovery
rules do: control enhances equality of access to information, and
hence negates an undeserved advantage by the party who began with
the greater share of evidence under his control.”271
267. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 2055 (2013) (“ Equity . . . is based on the principles
that no one is allowed to take unfair advantage of another and that no one is
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.”).
268. See Solum & Marzen, supra note 250, at 1138.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1139.
271. Id. at 1140.
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b. Eliminates Incentive to Lie
Finally, recognizing a claim for negligent spoliation would reduce
the incentive to lie. Judge Waltzer, concurring in Kammerer,
discussed in detail why an adverse presumption was in line with both
civilian tradition and Louisiana jurisprudence.272 In doing so, she
justified the need for an adverse presumption by saying that without
it, “there would be no loss to the destroying party, and a message
would go out to the community that evidence germane to issues in the
judicial process may be destroyed at will without negative
consequence.”273 This message would negatively impact the
effectiveness and fairness of adjudications.274 This same logic
justifies the need for negligent spoliation. By allowing a party to
escape the consequences of disposing of evidence merely because
they stated that it was an accident would send the message that Judge
Waltzer so feared. A set of facts that would be completely actionable
under intentional spoliation could quickly become completely nonactionable if the defending party merely states that its acts of
spoliation were an accident. This instant loss of a claim by the parties
is not in the best interest of our judicial system, nor our state.
CONCLUSION
As noted in Lewis, “this issue [of spoliation] is certainly ripe for
consideration.”275 There is a drastic disparity in how Louisiana
circuits treat the doctrine of negligent spoliation. The Louisiana
Supreme Court or Louisiana Legislature must recognize negligent
spoliation. At a minimum, negligent spoliation should be found when
a statutory or contractual duty is present, and in limited
circumstances, the duty should be found in article 2315. If negligent
spoliation is not adopted, Louisiana will erode statutory and contract
law, the judicial system will lose integrity, and the courts will
condone lying by litigants. For the sake of Louisiana’s citizens and its
law, it is time for Louisiana to formally recognize negligent
spoliation.
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